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Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils

Authors
Khalil, FahadLawarree, JacquesYun, Sungho
Issue Date
Jan-2010
Publisher
WILEY
Keywords
DESIGN; LAW; SOFT INFORMATION; DELEGATION; HIERARCHIES; COLLUSION; CORRUPTION; ENFORCEMENT; RENEGOTIATION; AGENT RELATIONSHIP
Citation
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, v.41, no.1, pp.179 - 198
Indexed
SSCI
AHCI
SCOPUS
Journal Title
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Volume
41
Number
1
Start Page
179
End Page
198
URI
https://scholarworks.bwise.kr/erica/handle/2021.sw.erica/40577
DOI
10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00095.x
ISSN
0741-6261
Abstract
Both bribery and extortion weaken the power of incentives, but there is a trade-off in fighting the two because rewards to prevent supervisors from accepting bribes create incentives for extortion. Which is the worse evil? A fear of inducing extortion may make it optimal to tolerate bribery, but extortion is never allowed. Extortion discourages "good behavior" because the agent suffers from it even though he has done the right thing, whereas a bribe acts as a penalty for "bad behavior." Our analysis provides lessons to fight corruption and explanations why developed countries may have an advantage in dealing with extortion.
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