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Verification of the Information Privately Owned by a Principal주인의 사적정보와 대리인의 정보수집
- Other Titles
- 주인의 사적정보와 대리인의 정보수집
- Authors
- Yun, Sung Ho
- Issue Date
- Sep-2008
- Publisher
- 한국계량경제학회
- Keywords
- 정보수집; 사적정보를 보유한 주인; 계약해지; Principal-Agent; Adverse Selection; Verification of information
- Citation
- 계량경제학보, v.19, no.3, pp.174 - 191
- Indexed
- SCOPUS
KCI
- Journal Title
- 계량경제학보
- Volume
- 19
- Number
- 3
- Start Page
- 174
- End Page
- 191
- ISSN
- 1229-2893
- Abstract
- We study a principal-agent relationship in which the information privately owned by a principal is subject to verification by an uninformed agent. The agent's information verification effort, however, is unverifiable(non-contractible). Therefore, the agent may accuse the truthful principal without verifying the reported information. The principal, in equilibrium, misreports with strictly positive probability to induce the agent to verify the reported information. Moreover, the principal designs the contract such that it is terminated when her misreport is discovered by the agent. Termination of the contract occurs with strictly positive probability on the equilibrium path.
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Collections - COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS > DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS > 1. Journal Articles
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Related Researcher
- yun, sung ho
- COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS (DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS)