Detailed Information
Cited 0 time in 
Cited 0 time in 
Cited 0 time in
Metadata Downloads
Supplier-buyer models for the bargaining process over a long-term replenishment contract
- Authors
- Kwak, Tae Cheol; Kim, Jong Soo; Moon, Chiung
- Issue Date
- Oct-2006
- Publisher
- Pergamon Press Ltd.
- Keywords
- supplier-buyer model; game theory; replenishment contract
- Citation
- Computers and Industrial Engineering, v.51, no.2, pp 219 - 228
- Pages
- 10
- Indexed
- SCIE
SCOPUS
- Journal Title
- Computers and Industrial Engineering
- Volume
- 51
- Number
- 2
- Start Page
- 219
- End Page
- 228
- ISSN
- 0360-8352
1879-0550
- Abstract
- This paper presents supplier-buyer models to describe the bargaining process between a supplier and a buyer over a long-term replenishment contract. Two different models are developed: one for the situation where the supplier has a superior bargaining power over the buyer, and the other for the reverse situation. For each model, a method is derived to find the best strategy of each agent via analysis based on a game-theoretic approach. The solution found by the method is verified to be the Nash Equilibrium of each model. The system costs of the models are compared to determine the economic implications of the results. (c) 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
- Files in This Item
- Go to Link
Items in ScholarWorks are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.