무상감자의 효과분석

Abstract

현행 상법과 자본시장에 관한 규정들은 상장기업들이 증권발행을 할 때, 액면가 미만으로 발행가를 설정하는 것을 제한하고 있다. 따라서 경영실적 악화로 인해 주가가 액면가 미만으로 형성된기업들은 무상감자 절차를 통해 시가를 액면가 이상으로 조정한 후, 유상증자나 채무증권 발행을수행하게 된다. 본 연구는 액면미만 발행제한 제도가 유도하는 무상감자의 효과를 분석하였다. 시가가 액면가 이하로 형성된 기업들은 경영실적이 악화된 기업들이므로 자본시장을 통한 자본조달필요성이 강화된 상황에 놓여 있다. 이들 기업들은 적시에 자본조달을 완수하지 못한다면 회생 가능성이 더 희박해질 수밖에 없을 것이다. 기업들은 액면미만 발행제한 제도를 명목적으로 회피하기 위해 감자절차를 활용하고 있는데, 감자절차는 상당한 사회적 비용을 야기하는 것으로 분석되었다. 기업의 내재가치에 아무런 영향을 주지하지 않는 감자결정이 25%의 시장가치 하락을 초래하는 것으로 나타났다. 뿐만 아니라 감자절차는 자본조달의 소요기간을 늘리고, 해당 기업의 주가변동성을 급등시킨다. 또한 많은 시장경고조치를 발동하게 함으로써 시장경고조치의 효과성을 저해시키고 있다. 감자절차가 유효한 시장통제장치(market control mechanism)로서의 기능을 수행한다는 증거도 찾을 수 없었다. 분석결과를 종합하면 감자제도와 또 이를 유도하는 액면미만 발행제한 제도는 그 유효성이 부족하고 사회적 비용만 과다하므로 이에 대한 제도개선이 필요한 것으로 판단된다.

Current regulations on seasoned equity offering prohibit issuing firms from setting equity offer price below par. Firms with stock price below par,however, elude the regulation by implementing capital-reduction. By analysing the effect of capital reduction, this paper proposes to dismantle the restriction and reinforce the market price principle. Current restriction on equity offer price has caused significant difficulties for companies to raise capital. The system has so far not contributed to enhancing investor protection. By its nature, the restriction on issues below par values goes against the principle of market price issues. Under the restriction, companies whose stock prices are below par values have to first go through paid-in-capital reduction in order to lift up their stock prices to the level above par before issuing stocks or hybrid bonds. However, the long and complex procedures of paid-in-capital reduction make it impossible for the companies to raise capital in a timely manner. In addition, the paidin-capital reduction usually accompanies abrupt rises in stock return volatility and abnormal trading activities, and thus often triggers the KRX’s market warnings. Besides, the probability of stock price manipulation is often brought up in line with this issue. In this paper, we analyze the social cost incurred by paid-in-capital reduction, specifically the one which has been used to find a way round the restriction by companies with stock prices below their par values. In theory, capital reduction should not result in any value change at all. We, however, find that capital reduction firms suffer from around 25%value loss. We could not find any difference in firm characteristics between fast and slow track in capital reduction. However, firms that completed capital reduction by slow track are more likely forced to be delisted from exchanges,compared to fast track firms. This evidence suggests that the value loss of capital reduction is due to administrational procedures of capital reduction. Market values of listed companies are determined by numerous investors in an open market. Thus, it is reasonable to dismantle the restriction on equity offer price in SEOs. Stocks of a listed company are publicly offered to and owned by many and unspecified shareholders. Shareholders’ liabilities are also spread out in a form of capital gains and losses via stock trading at market prices. Therefore, regulations related to listing should be reconsidered. Such critical views also further lead to questioning whether par values of stocks should continue to exist or not. Developed capital markets in nations such as the United States, Canada, and Japan have already widely adopted no-par value stocks. No-par value stocks would provide the foundation for reforming all unreasonable regulations related with paid-in-capital.