A continuous strategy game for power transactions analysis in competitive electricity markets
- Authors
- Park, JB; Kim, BH; Kim, JH; Jung, MH; Park, JK
- Issue Date
- Nov-2001
- Publisher
- IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
- Keywords
- continuous strategy; deregulation; game theory; PoolCo model; spot market
- Citation
- IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, v.16, no.4, pp.847 - 855
- Journal Title
- IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS
- Volume
- 16
- Number
- 4
- Start Page
- 847
- End Page
- 855
- URI
- https://scholarworks.bwise.kr/hongik/handle/2020.sw.hongik/27176
- DOI
- 10.1109/59.962436
- ISSN
- 0885-8950
- Abstract
- This paper presents a game theory application for analyzing power transactions in a deregulated energy marketplace such as PoolCo, where participants, especially, generating entities, maximize their net profits through optimal bidding strategies (i.e., bidding prices and bidding generations). In this paper, the electricity market for power transactions is modeled as a noncooperative game with complete information, where the solution is determined in a continuous strategy domain having recourse to the Nash equilibrium idea. In order to provide more apprehensible analysis, we suggest a new hybrid solution approach employing a 2-dimensional graphical approach as well as an analytical method. Finally, the proposed approach is demonstrated on a sample power system.
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Collections - College of Engineering > School of Electronic & Electrical Engineering > 1. Journal Articles
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