감사인에 대한 고객의 경제적 중요성과 임원보수

Abstract

Purpose: The main purpose of this study was to examine the association between the client’s economic importance to the auditor and executive compensation with unique Korean firm sample, thereby indicating whether this association supports either the strict governance hypothesis or the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. Further, it tried to investigate whether this relationship is link to auditor selection. Research design, data, and methodology: The data for this study are from the period between 2007 and 2012 and the final sample consists of 3,403 firm-year observations that are traded on the KOSPI market. The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models are used for testing Hypotheses. Results: First, there is no significant moderating effect of executive compensation on the association between client importance and earnings management, suggesting that auditor independence is not impaired among firms that pay their managers substantial compensation. Second, there is a negative association between client importance and executive compensation, supporting the strict governance hypothesis, as there had been no loss of auditor independence. Third, there is a negative association between the prior year’s executive compensation and the current year’s client importance, suggesting that managers who received higher compensation in the prior year tend to engage with auditors of strict integrity. Conclusions: The findings provide support for the strict governance hypothesis and contribute to the research on executive compensation by providing evidence on the crucial role of auditors in determining executive pay.