How does oil affect electoral competition in multiparty elections?

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of oil on electoral competitiveness in multiparty autocracies, with a particular focus on non-democratic political systems. Combining insights from the literature on the rentier state and the study of multiparty autocracy, I examine how oil production influences elections in these contexts. I posit that the significant and opaque government revenue generated by oil production undermines electoral competitiveness in multiparty autocracies. The analysis draws on a comprehensive dataset covering all multiparty elections worldwide from 1975 to 2010. The findings support my hypothesis, revealing a strong negative association between oil and electoral competitiveness in multiparty autocracies. Conversely, the influence of oil on electoral dynamics in democratic settings appears to be negligible. This study contributes to the literature on democratization through elections by shedding light on the role of economic structures in shaping electoral outcomes. It underscores the challenges faced by multiparty autocracies in their pursuit of liberalization and emphasizes the importance of further exploration into the interplay between natural resources, political systems, and the democratic process.